By using local quantum teleportation of a fixed state to one qubit of an entangled pair sent from the other party, it is shown how one party can commit a bit with only classical information as evidence that results in an unconditionally secure protocol. The well-known "impossibility proof" does not cover such protocols due to its different commitment and opening prescriptions.
on H 2 ⊗ H 3 for any state |φ on H 3 , he would obtain each result i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, with probability 1 4 corresponding to Ψ ± and Φ ± , with resulting state in H 1 given by:
where σ i are given by σ 1 = −σ z , σ 2 = −σ 0 = −I, σ 3 = −iσ y , σ 4 = σ x in terms of the Pauli spin operators. Let {|0 , |1 } be an openly known orthonormal basis of a qubit. To commit b = 0 or 1, Adam may use |φ = |b on H 3 and obtains U k σ i |b on H 1 from (1), announcing i to Babe as the committed evidence. He opens by claiming b and sending H 1 to Babe, who verifies by measuring the one-dimensional projection of the state U k σ i |b . It is evident that the protocol is perfectly concealing if she does not entangle the possible U k : with orthogonal states |i representing the classical information committed by Adam, ρ For the corresponding binding proof of the situation in which Adam opens one bit value perfectly, say opening b = 0 with probability 1, we will first show that Adam cannot cheat perfectly, i.e., his optimal cheating probability P A c of opening b = 1 instead is bounded away from 1. This can be seen by exhausting all of his possible actions. First note that there is no entanglement possibility for him either over the single state |b , or over the classical information i even if it is represented by |i , as only a specific i is accepted as legitimate. In order to cheat perfectly, Adam has several courses of action left. The first one is for him to teleport |0 to U k σ i |0 and then apply some V A to try changing it to U k σ i |1 . Another is for him to announce some i without a Bell measurement and perform the teleportation on some |φ ∈ H 3 with result j when he opens b, applying some V A to H 1 to obtain the proper opening state. The third is just sending some |φ back to Babe and try to open correctly. In the first case, his probability of successful cheating is given by, for a given i,
where λ k is probability that U k was employed by Babe.
To obtain P A c = 1, one would need each of the terms in the sum of (2) to be one, which is impossible if {U k } is chosen to be, say, {I, R x , R y , R z } where R x is the rotation about thex-axis of the qubit by an angle π/2 in its Bloch-sphere representation, etc.,
This is due to the fact that for each U k , there are only one possible rotations
and there is no common rotation that works for all k. In the second situation the successful cheating probability is, for a given pair (i, j) and a given b,
Again, equation (4) cannot be made equal to 1 with (3) similar to the case of (2). In the third case,
which clearly cannot be 1 as V A |φ is independent of k. Note that the last two courses of action actually do not allow him to open b = 0 perfectly already. Also, other {U k } can be used in lieu of (3) .
Note the role of the classical evidence i and the role of Babe's application of U k in preventing Adam's perfect cheating. Note also that Adam has no entanglement cheating, in contrast to the IP formulation. To summarize, Adam's optimum cheating probability is some fixed number P A c = p A < 1 for perfect b=0 opening. The exact value of p A depends on the set {U k } and its probability distribution, and can be determined by solving the optimization problems corresponding to his possible actions described above. But there is no need to determine this value for the purpose of proving the possibility of obtaining unconditionally secure protocols. Babe may entangle over the possible U k so that she keeps H C and sends
In this situation, one can cast the protocol in the IP formulation for a fixed Bell-measurement result i known to both parties by combining (1) and (6), and the protocol is not perfectly concealing. If Adam commits only a partial Bell-measurement result, the protocol can still be cast in the IP formulation if he only makes the partial (degenerate) Bell-measurement, and not the full one, and then randomizes. To obtain -concealing, one can employ the following strategy -Babe sends Adam an ordered sequence of n qubit pairs {H 1 ⊗ H 2 }, each entangled in the form (6) with λ k = 1 4 , |f k ∈ H C , and {U k } given by (3) . Adam randomly picks one of these pairs, H¯ 1 ⊗ H¯ 2 , and performs the quantum teleportation. He commits the result i of the Bell-measurement as evidence, but not the name of the pair or H 1 itself. He opens by sending in H¯ 1 and all the other n − 1 qubit pairs. Babe verifies by measuring the projections onto U¯ k σ i |b on H¯ 1 (or the projection onto (6) in H C ⊗ H 1 ), and (U k ⊗ I)|Ψ − 12 on the other pairs. It is easily seen that this preliminary protocol QBC5p is -concealing, as Babe has probability 1 n of guessing the correct H C for entanglement cheating to obtain a cheating probabilityP . At the same time, Adam cannot cheat perfectly by operation on H¯ 1 as above, and he cannot entangle the different possibilities of using any of the n qubit pairs to obtain i -due to the verification proecedure he could use only one qubit pair for teleportation. One cannot entangle the different possibilities involving measurements and no-measurements on different state spaces. The impossibility proof assumes that all opening possibilities can be purified in an entanglement without a proof that it is true in all possible situations. The above protocol provides an example for which such an assumption is not valid.
Thus far the "impossibility proof" has already been contradicted, since it asserts [1] that whenever the protocol is -concealing, i.e., Babe's optimum cheating probability is P Exhaustively, they can be described by the following and their combinations: approximate cloning of Ψ k , using different states than |b on H 3 , announcing a different i from his Bell measurement, opening by sending a different qubit from H 1 to Babe, and simply announcing a different bit value at opening. Two of these are already included in the above analysis. By continuity of all relevant functions on a finite-dimensional space, it is readily seen that if Adam opens on b=0 with probability P A (0) = 1 − δ 1 , then he can cheat no better than P A c = p A + δ 2 with lim δ1→0 δ 2 = 0. While the optimum P A c for arbitrary P A (0) remains to be determined, there is no need to include it here as there does not seem to be much interest in protocols where both P A (0) and P A (1) are not close to 1. In any event, the optimum tradeoff between P A (0) and P A (1) may be determined and the average probability of opening correctly to Adam's choice can be brought down to arbitrarily small level similar to the following P A (0) = 1 case.
Protocol QBC5' is obtained when the above QBC5p is repeated in a sequence of N such n-pairs, each consisting of the above protocol step with the same b opening. Adam's cheating probabilityP A c = p N A can be made arbitrarily small for large N . Babe's entanglement of the N n pairs clearly does not help her cheat as she is left with the same small probability of matching the correct H C to the announced i. However, herP B c is improved by the N repetitions, but it can be made arbitrarily small for any fixed N by making n large. (The quantitative treatment of a similar situation has been given in Section VI of Ref. [3] .) Thus, the protocol QBC5 is -concealing and -binding for any desired > 0.
So far we have allowed Adam to cheat during both commitment and opening but assumed that Babe is honest in sending Adam the "legal" states. Honesty during commitment in a multi-stage protocol is an assumption of the "impossibility proof," which has to be relaxed for a truly secure protocol. In QBC5, Babe can cheat by, e.g., sending |ψ k |ψ k , an unentangled state in H 1 ⊗ H 2 , so that the Bell measurement probability on |ψ k |b in H 2 ⊗ H 3 depends on b. This kind of cheating, sending in a different state other than one allowed in a multi-stage protocol, can be handled in two different ways in general that also apply effectively to the "impossibility proof" formulation for certain protocols. The first way is to let one party send in a large number of the allowed states so that the other party can check for honesty on most of them and then use the rest. In the present case, Babe would send Adam a large number M of pairs, so Adam can set aside m M of them, and asks Babe for the exact state in the other M − m pairs. With or without her entanglement over such pairs, Babe has to tell exactly what each state is, which Adam can verify by a projection measurement. With M sufficiently large, it may be shown that the probability that any of the m remaining states is not a legal one allowed by the protocol, up to entanglement by Babe, given all M − m are, can be made arbitrarily small for any m. The detailed analysis of this approach for the present problem is given in Appendix A of our next paper [4] .
What if Babe is found cheating during such testing? Clearly, one party can always refuse to cooperate in any protocol, which is what repeated cheating and getting caught amounts to. It does not alter the fact that the protocol allows arbitrarily small cheating probability. One meaningful way to deal with repeated cheatings applicable to realistic environments is to allow a fixed number n c of cheating detection, beyond which the cheating party is taken to be the loser in an essentially classical game-theoretic formulation. The above N -ensemble can be generalized to deal with such a formulation, but it is conceptually simpler to have the following explicit gametheoretic formulation, our second way to handle the use of non-allowed states during commitment. In such a formulation, there is no N -ensemble sent simultaneously. Only one pair is sent, but the other party has a large probability of choosing to check the validity of that state instead of going further with the protocol. During the successive trials, the other party may decide at any point to stop checking and accept the state. It is clear that with potentially an unlimited number of trials, the probability of successfully sneaking in a nonallowed state can be made arbitrarily small for any fixed n c . With n c set to be zero, essentially no cheating can be attempted at all without undue risk of losing the game. A quantitative description of this approach is given in Appendix A of this paper.
With either of these two ways, one can safely be assured that the parties are honest during the exchanges of states or quantum communications in the commitment phase of a multi-stage protocol, as was assumed in the "impossibility proof" formulation. Under this condition, we have completed the concealing and binding proof of the following simplification of the above protocol QBC5'. PROTOCOL QBC5 ∈ H 1 ⊗ H 2 , ∈ {1, . . . , nN }, named by their positions, with each U k , k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, randomly drawn from {U k } = {I, Rx, Ry, Rz}, the R's being π/2 rotations about the qubit axes.
(ii) Adam teleports the state |b for the bit b he wants to commit to n randomly selected pairs among the nN ones, committing to Babe the Bell-measurement results im, m ∈ {1, . . . , n} without the corresponding names of the pairs.
(iii) Adam opens by sending {Hm1} and all the other pairs together with their names to Babe, who verifies by corresponding measurements.
To recapitulate the main reason for the security of QBC5: one cannot purify the different possibilities of measuring different components of a tensor product space while leaving the remaining part of the space untouched. In QBC5, the tensor product space is (H 1 ⊗ H 2 ) and the different components are H 1 ⊗ H 2 indexed by . Adam cannot entangle the different possible actual measurements, and if he does not actually measure, he could not open b = 0 perfectly corresponding to the committed i, which Babe could measure for him anyway in case he just sends her the register containing the information i.
In addition to teleportation, it is shown in Ref. [4] that the use of a split entangled pair can yield an unconditionally secure protocol. A general discussion on the scope of the "impossibility proof" is given in Ref. [2] together with the security proofs of several other protocols.
APPENDIX A: HONESTY GUARANTEE IN A GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION
During the commitment phase of a multi-stage QBC protocol involving exchanges of quantum states, a party can try to cheat by using "illegal" states not allowed in the protocol. In the "impossibility proof", this problem is not tackled by assuming each party is honest, which is an unreasonable assumption in a protocol that precisely does not place trust in either party. It turns out, however, that a simple classical game formulation can take care of this problem, up to entanglement of legal states, in the following way.
Suppose B is giving A a quantum system in possible allowable states {ψ k }, to be further processed by A. To make sure that the state is legal with a probability arbitrarily close to 1, A can ask B to reveal the state and check it by corresponding projection measurement. The cheating detection probability is denoted by p d , which is determined by the illegal states ψ used by Babe that would allow her to cheat beyond , P B c − 1 2 ≥ . After checking, the whole protocol would need to be repeated up to that point, but there is no question of resource or efficiency in the present context.
Assuming first that the allowable number of cheats is n c = 0, i.e., if B is found cheating the game is over and B will be declared the loser. Such a situation occurs, e.g., when the penalty of being found cheating is arbitrarily large. We let A employ a randomized strategy with a probability p a of accepting B's state without checking, independently from trial to trial without loss of generality in this case. Thus B's strategy can also be represented by a probability p c of cheating at each trial. In an indefinitely long sequence of trials, B's successful cheating probability P C can be found as follows. The probability B will succeed at the first trial is p c p a , at the second is p c p a (1 − p a − p c p d ), and at the nth is p c p a (1 − p a − p c p d ) n−1 . Thus, the total successful cheating probability after n trials is
Similarly, the probability that a legal state is accepted after n trials is
and the probability a cheating would be detected is
Observing that for fixed p d > 0, P D (n) → 0 is equivalent to p c → 0 from (A3). We have
With a large penalty for cheating, P D would be driven to zero from minimizing the average penalty. Hence p c and P C are also driven to zero, as expected, with P A → 1. Even if no penalty is imposed, P C (n) may be made arbitrarily small for any p c > 0 by making n large and p a /p d small from (A1), while the corresponding P A (n) needs not be close to 1. Since a party has to cooperate and accept a protocol if his/her security is guaranteed, as formalized by the "Intent Principle" of ref [5] on protocol agreement, B must pick a small p c to accept a viable protocol in this situation.
With n c > 0 but finite, the same situation as above arises after n c − 1 detections of cheating, which would occur with probability arbitrarily close to 1 for a long enough number n of trials. It is also possible for A to terminate the game at any point by accepting the state after a fixed number of trials n a . Even though a more complicated optimal strategy that is trial stage-dependent for either party would then emerge, it would go over to the above for large n.
If {ψ k } is the set of allowable states, this procedure only assures that the state ψ ∈ H B ⊗ H C that B sends in is of the form
for orthonormal |f k ∈ H C . Often B cannot cheat already in such a case as the Type 5 ones in this paper, although in general B may still be able to cheat using (A6).
In the full unconditionally secure protocol that requiring a sequence, the above game can be repeated successively one by one. The levels of each probability (A1)-(A3) can be adjusted to accommodate the desired level on the overall probabilities for the n-sequence.
When applied to protocols such as QBC4 of Ref. [4] , this procedure is to be trivially extended to include the other party sending in part of an entangled pair before measurement verification by one party.
